








Sometimes we vote on the issues. Consider a voter who detests gun control. They might, on this basis, 
vote Republican. Their opposition to gun control drives their vote choice. They vote Republican 
because they share the Republican party’s policy position. But sometimes we instead vote on 
performance. Consider a voter who loves the booming 1990s economy. They might, on this basis, 
vote for Clinton. Their assessment of the incumbent’s performance drives their vote. They vote for 
Clinton because, well, it is the economy, stupid. And, sometimes, we vote on group identities. Consider 
a Catholic from 1960. Perhaps they cannot stomach voting against their church. They might, on this 
basis, vote for Kennedy. They vote for Kennedy because he is a Catholic, like them. Their group 
identities drive their vote. These voters differ in the basis on which they vote. They differ in the 
reasons they have for voting the way they do. Policy issues drive issue voters. Performance issues drive 
performance voters. Group identities drive group voters. But which type of voting is best for 
democracy? And how well do we do? And, finally, on what basis should each of us vote?  
 
These questions concern a single topic: voter motivation. The first question plumbs how the 
prevalence of different kinds of voter motivations impact democratic values. Answering this tells us 
what would motivate voters in an ideal democracy. The second question plumbs how voters’ actual 
motivations matter to such values. Answering this tells us how far from the ideal our real-world 
democracies are. The third plumbs what motivations should drive actual individual voters. The answer 
to this depends, in part, on how voters contribute to democratic values in their non-ideal democracies. 
For each question, I will concern myself with intrinsic democratic values alone. These are the ways 
that democracy is valuable in itself, besides its causal consequences. Voter motivations no doubt 
matter to the instrumental value of a democracy. But democracy’s intrinsic value is my focus. For the 
second and third questions, I will concern myself with American voters and American democracy 
alone. Much of what I will say applies elsewhere. But American democracy is my focus. Together, 
these questions plumb how voter motivations interact, both evaluatively and deontically, with the 
intrinsic value of American democracy. That interaction is the topic of this paper.  
 
These three types of voting have been the subject of sustained empirical investigation. But they have 
not been the subject of much normative investigation. When political scientists evaluate them, they 
do so in terms of instrumental values. For example, they explore which motivation will produce the 
best policy.1 They ignore how these motivations matter to intrinsic democratic values. Meanwhile, 
political theorists have written a lot about voting but little about voter motivations. Rather, they have 
addressed whether citizens ought to vote in the first place. The driving problem here is that each vote 
 
1 See, for instance, the Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, ch. 4 discussion of retrospective voting. 
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has a very small chance of making a difference to an election. So: is it rational to vote at all?2 Much 
time has been spent on this question. Little has been spent exploring what should motivate those who 
do vote.3 Jason Brennan has investigated a connected topic.4 He has examined whether those who 
vote ought to know about politics.5 The connection, as we will see later, is that voter competence and 
voter motivation interact in contributing to democratic values. But voter competence, on its own, tells 
us little about voter motivations. Voter motivations, then, have been largely neglected: I think that 
that neglect is unfair. Such motivations, I will argue, matter to the intrinsic value of democracy. 
 
Here’s the plan for the rest of the paper. In Section 1, I will say more about the nature and prevalence 
of these different types of voter motivations. In Section 2, I will outline two core intrinsic democratic 
values: equality and self-rule. In Section 3 we will identify how different types of voter motivations 
matter to these values. My view is that issue voting is better than performance voting and performance 
voting is better than group voting. This is not meant to be a radical view. It seems to me the 
conventional wisdom. But the grounds of that wisdom are not well understood. This paper identifies 
those grounds. In Section 4 we will turn to how these types of voter motivation interact with voter 
competence. I will argue that voter incompetence modulates the effect of voter motivations on self-
rule but leaves their effect on equality untouched. In Section 5 we will see what this means for 
American democracy. The American voter, I will suggest, rarely votes in the ways intrinsic democratic 
values require. American democracy is deeply defective. Finally, in Section 6, we will see what that 
means for how Americans should vote. The key conclusion here is that their non-ideal circumstances 
weaken their obligations. In such conditions, they merely must avoid voting on privileged group 
identities.  
 
1. Types of Voter Motivation 
 
The three kinds of voting we will focus on are voting on the issues, voting on performance and voting 
on group identities. We focus on these not because they are the only possible motivations voters could 
have. Rather, we focus on them precisely because they have been the subject of such sustained 
empirical investigation. Issue voting is at the core of spatial modelling of voting behavior.6 Early 
empirical researchers took it be an influential driver of voting.7 Voting on performance became a topic 
core to the study of voting behavior in the 1970s. A vast literature plumbs, in particular, whether and 
how voters respond to the economic performance of incumbents.8 Voting on group identities was a 
preoccupation of the early empirical literature on voting behavior.9 Recently, it has again become a 
 
2 For the problem see Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 274. For three different responses, see Parfit, Reasons and 
Persons, 73–75; Goldman, “Why Citizens Should Vote”; Guerrero, “The Paradox of Voting and the Ethics of Political 
Representation.” 
3 Some working in the ‘public reason’ tradition do discuss it. Such writers claim, or presuppose, that state action is legitimate 
if and only if it is supported by a justification all reasonable people accept. Among those who think this, Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, 235 denies that motivation matters much to how we should vote. Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection, 274–90 
contends that it does. It is not clear, however, what import this discussion has for those of us who do not accept public 
reason presuppositions. 
4 Brennan, The Ethics of Voting. 
5 Brennan thinks so. For a reply, see Arvan, “People Do Not Have a Duty to Avoid Voting Badly.” 
6 Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, ch. 8. 
7 Campbell et al., The American Voter, 112–136. 
8 Kramer, “Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964”; Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National 
Elections. 
9 Berelson et al., Voting, 58–87; Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, The Voter Decides, 88–112. 
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prominent focus. Achen and Bartels claim that, in the political sphere, group identities form “the very 
basis of reasons.”10 This empirical literature allows us to assess the prevalence of each kind of voter 
motivation. As we will later see, that will be essential to evaluating the quality of American democracy 
and the duties of American citizens. But first I will say more about each kind of voting.  
 
We will begin with issue voting. This is voting on the basis of shared policy platform or issue positions. 
Consider Democrats who voted for Obama because they wanted public healthcare. They were issue 
voting. Or consider Republicans who voted for Trump because they wanted to build a wall. They too 
were issue voting. Their agreement with that candidate on the issues drove their vote. They wanted 
certain policies enacted. These candidates said that they would enact them. This is why they voted for 
the candidate. How often does issue voting happen? The preponderance of evidence indicates that it 
does not happen very often. There are two weighty pieces of evidence for this.11 The first turns on 
what voters say when you ask them what they like about different candidates. They rarely mention 
policy issues. Fewer than twenty percent mention any issue positions at all. So issue positions seem 
unlikely to drive vote choice. The second is that voters themselves likely lack firm positions on most 
issues. Their expressed issue positions are inconstant. At one time, they will say that they are all for, 
for example, federally provided universal employment. At another they will say that they are all against 
it. Voters seem to be constructing an opinion on the fly.12 But opinions constructed on the fly surely 
do not drive vote choice. This evidence suggests that issue voting is relatively rare: it happens more 
often in textbooks than ballot boxes.  
 
Not everyone is convinced by this evidence. Some people think that issue voting happens quite often. 
They point out that voters’ issue stances correlate with their vote choice. Voters vote for the party 
who shares their issue stances. And so these people infer that voters’ issue positions drive who they 
vote for.13 But, in turn, many find this argument unconvincing. The problem is that this evidence does 
not establish the direction of causality. People often take their issue position from the party who they 
are going to vote for. They conform their policy stance to the party line. So these correlations might 
be due to people’s vote choice driving their policy preferences rather than their policy preferences 
driving their vote choice.14 And there’s good evidence that this is what is going on. In some cases, one 
can identify exactly when people find out that they do not share their preferred candidate’s issue 
position. Afterwards, they more often change their mind on the issue than stop liking the candidate.15 
So, it seems to me unlikely that issue voting happens very often. 
 
10 Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, 213. 
11 The first of these pieces comes from Campbell et al., The American Voter and the second comes from Converse, “The 
Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Republics.” For contemporary updates on both pieces of evidence, see Lewis-Beck et 
al., The American Voter Revisited, ch. 10 and Kinder and Kalmoe, Neither Liberal nor Conservative. 
12 Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion for more discussion. 
13 Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder, “The Strength of Issues” for an influential example of this argument. 
14 For this reply, see Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, 41–45. 
15 The direct evidence for this is from Lenz, Follow the Leader, ch. 3, 8. But see Cohen, “Party Over Policy” and Berinsky, 
In Times of War for supporting evidence. Now, one explanation of these findings is that voters have firm ideologies, but do 
not know what policies best align with those ideologies. Yet they can identify which politicians share their ideologies. Thus, 
they adopt the policy stances of these politicians as a quick and easy way of adopting the policy stance most congruent 
with their ideologies. Both Popkins, The Reasoning Voter and Lupia and McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma make this claim. 
But I doubt this for two reasons. First, I doubt that voters have firm ideologies. As Kinder, “Opinion and Action in the 
Realm of Politics,” 796, says “[p]recious few Americans make sophisticated use of political abstractions. Most are mystified 
by or at least indifferent to standard ideological concepts.” The evidence for this is, inter alia, that many citizens are simply 
unable to say much about the content of different political ideologies. Here see Kinder and Kalmoe, Neither Liberal nor 
Conservative, 11–43. Second, there are other explanations of what is going on when voters adopts elites’ policy stances. The 
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Now let us turn to performance voting. This is voting based on the expected performance of the 
candidates.16 It is voting on one’s expectations about their performance at promoting widely shared 
goals. Think of those Democrats who voted for Clinton because they thought he'd boost the economy. 
They were performance voting. Or consider Republicans who voted for Bush because they thought 
he'd make America safer. They too were performance voting. These people might have had no view 
on which policies would help with prosperity or safety. They might just have had views on which 
candidate will best promote such goals. Often, such views are based on assessments of prior 
performance in office. These are called retrospective assessments. But they might also be based in the 
perceived personal qualities of candidates: their integrity, intelligence, competence and so on. All these 
things can ground assessments of a candidate’s expected performance.  
 
Among political scientists, the consensus is that performance voting is extremely common. The best 
evidence for this involves retrospective voting on the economy. A huge number of observational 
studies look at such voting behavior. Incumbents suffer when the economy is diving. They flourish 
when it is rising.17 There are also some panel survey studies on performance voting. These studies 
interview the same individuals many times. This lets them see whether performance assessments 
change before vote intention changes or vice versa. Gabriel Lenz’s Follow the Leader is a landmark such 
study.18 He shows that, when people think the economy is doing badly, they later reduce their approval 
of incumbent presidents. The former seems to be causing the latter. It is a short jump from this to the 
conclusion that economic perceptions also drive vote choice. Performance issues, or at least the issue 
of prosperity, have a pervasive impact on vote choice.  
 
Let us turn to group voting. This is voting on the basis of group identities. Catholics voted for 
Kennedy. White southerners voted for Wallace. Black people voted for Obama. It is standard to 
understand this in terms of social identities.19 Social identities start with self-categorization: we see 
ourselves as members of certain groups. And they add to this an emotional charge: we care about our 
group memberships. How does that affect voting behavior? Well, when we have such a social identity, 
we are driven to achieve positive distinctiveness for it. That means we are driven to raise the status of 
our group relative to that of other groups: we want to “maintain or achieve superiority over an out-
group.”20 In the electoral context, getting a group member or affiliate into office is the main way to 
do this. Having a president who comes from your group enhances your group’s status. Thus, we often 
 
foremost puts it down to motivated reasoning: partisans are strongly driven to agree with their party. They care much less 
about whether they have accurate political beliefs. Lab experiments cohere better with this view that the one that rests on 
ideology. See, for example, Petersen et al., “Motivated Reasoning and Political Parties”; Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook, 
“The Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion.” So the ideology-based explanation of these findings 
seems to me dubious. But, in any case, the key point is that these findings mean correlations between issue positions and 
vote choice are weak evidence that the former cause the latter. 
16 For the “performance” terminology, see Lenz, Follow the Leader, 2. We might label this kind of voting “expected 
performance voting” instead of performance voting. But to retain consistency with the empirical literature I prefer to 
simple call it “performance voting.” 
17 For the seminal works on this, see Key, The Responsible Electorate; Kramer, “Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting 
Behavior, 1896-1964”; Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. For a recent discussion of this classic 
literature, see Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, 93–98. For an overview of the later literature, see Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier, “Economic Voting.” 
18 Lenz, Follow the Leader? How Voters Respond to Politicians’ Policies and Performance. 
19 See, for example, Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, 228–29 and Mason, Uncivil Agreement, 1–17. 
20 Tajfel and Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,” 378. 
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vote for fellow group members or affiliates of our groups. When I talk about group voting, I mean 
voting so driven by social identities.  
 
Why construe group voting like this? Because it comports well with social identity theory. This theory 
is rooted in experiments Henri Tajfel did in the late 1960s. Tajfel set out to plumb the origins of group 
conflict. He assigned people to groups arbitrarily. In one such experiment, he did this by asking them 
which of two abstract artworks they preferred. After picking, the subjects were told they were either 
in the group which liked Klee or that which liked Kandinsky. He then asked them to allocate money 
among the other subjects. They could choose to ensure either that (a) everyone got the maximum 
amount of money, or (b) their group got more money than the other group, but less than the maximum 
possible. He found subjects favored (b). They preferred their group to be worse off in absolute terms 
but better off relative to other groups.21 These experiments showed, first, that it is easy to motivate 
people by group identities. In Tajfel’s experiments, subjects never even saw members of either group. 
They were told only that they had similar taste in art. And they showed, second, that when driven by 
such identities, we do not just want our group to do well. We want it to win: we want it to be superior 
to other groups. These claims are at the core of social identity theory. The first makes it likely that 
identities are operative in political contexts. The second suggests that we should understand that 
operation in terms of status enhancement. Thus, this more basic psychological theory grounds our 
construal of group voting.  
 
Group voting also seems to be very common. Race, religion, gender, geography are all common bases 
for group voting.22 But perhaps the most common type of group voting is voting on party 
identification. Those who identify as Democrats vote for the Democratic party. Those who identify 
as Republicans vote for the Republican party. Why think of this as a kind of group voting? Because 
party identification behaves like a social identity. It is more like Catholicism than it is like 
Libertarianism.23 People avow their party identifications in survey interviews. They talk about their 
party in terms of ‘we’. They feel attacks on their party as personal insults. They get a party identification 
by early adulthood. They usually stick with it for the rest of their lives. Party identification looks for 
all the world like a social identity.24 Thus, since it has a pervasive impact on vote choice, group 
identities have such an impact. 
 
In sum, on the strength of this evidence, group and performance voting happen often. Issue voting is 
rarer. I want to end this section with two final, clarificatory, points. First, I wish to stress again that 
these three kinds of voting do not exhaust voters’ possible motivations. Perhaps voters also vote based 
on candidate charisma, or on their perceived self-interest. But we have less empirical traction on these 
issues than on the three types of voter motivation just canvassed.25 And, as the evidence I have cited 
 
21 For the striking original finding, see Tajfel, Billig, and Bundy, “Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour.” It has 
been widely replicated. See, for example, Billig and Tajfel, “Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup Behaviour”; 
Locksley, Ortiz, and Hepburn, “Social Categorization and Discriminatory Behavior”; Gagnon and Bourhis, 
“Discrimination in the Minimal Group Paradigm.” 
22 Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, ch. 7 lay out some case studies supporting this. 
23 Campbell et al., The American Voter is the canonical source of this idea. 
24 For this evidence, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, Partisan Hearts and Minds, 32–40, ch. 3. 
25 In this connection, I want to make a remark about self-interest as a voter motivation. There is a large literature, stemming 
from Kinder and Kiewiet, “Sociotropic Politics,” on whether performance voters are pocketbook voters or sociotropic voters. 
Pocketbook voters vote for incumbents when they think that they personally have been doing well. Sociotropic voters 
vote for incumbents when they think that the national economy has been doing well. This distinction is sometimes equated 
with that between self-interested and altruistic voting. See e.g. Brennan, The Ethics of Voting, 162–63; Against Democracy., 
49–51; “The Ethics and Rationality of Voting.” But this is a mistake. Sociotropic voters, as Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck, “No 
 6 
indicates, many of these kinds of voter motivations clearly matter. They have a big impact on how 
voters behave. So, they are a good place at which to start. They carve out important drivers of voter 
behavior the prevalence of which we have some grasp on. Thus, understanding the normative 
significance of these kinds of voter behavior will put us in a position to answer concrete normative 
questions about American democracy.  
 
Second, many voters no doubt have multiple of these motivations. They are motivated in part by the 
issues, in part by performance, and in part by group identities. Sometimes, these motivations may be 
entangled. One might, for example, have one’s policy position because of one’s group identity. 
Perhaps one opposes gun control because one identifies as a white man.26 Or, to take another example, 
one’s group identity might lead one to prioritize certain performance issues. Perhaps one think 
terrorism is the top priority, because one identifies as a Republican.27 Nonetheless, we can disentangle 
the impact of different motivations. In theory, although rarely in practice, we can say of individual 
voters the relative force of these factors. We can say whether they were driven more by the issues, or 
by performance, or by group identities. In both theory and practice we can say, for the electorate as a 
whole, which of these motivations has the biggest impact on vote choice. That is what the empirical 
work just cited attempts to do. We will return to this issue in section 3 But that is all we will need to 
do to answer our normative questions. Yet, before turning to that, I must say more about what makes 
democracy valuable.  
 
2. Democratic Values 
 
In this section, I spell out a conception of democracy’s intrinsic value. This conception will be my 
own. But it has deep roots in democratic theory. The conception concerns intrinsic democratic values 
alone. These contrast with instrumental values. Intrinsic values make things valuable in themselves. 
Instrumental values make things valuable for their causal consequences or capacities. A good 
friendship is intrinsically valuable. A good hammer is just instrumentally valuable. The intrinsic 
democratic values we will focus on are equality and self-rule. In recent years, writers such as Niko 
Kolodny and Daniel Viehoff have advocated for the former.28 They think that democracies are 
egalitarian in a way other political systems are not.29 Advocacy of the latter has a long and venerable 
history. This is the value tapped by Rousseau when he insists that “[t]he people, subjected to law, 
ought to be its author” and the United Nations when its treaties assert that “everyone has a right to 
self-determination.”30 My own view is that all non-instrumental democratic values reduce to these two 
 
Man Is an Island” argue persuasively, may be entirely self-interested. They may be voting for the candidate who they see 
as good for the national economy solely because they themselves will do well when the national economy is doing well. 
Indeed, this point is made clear by Kinder and Kiewiet’s initial paper on this topic. In Kinder and Kiewiet, “Sociotropic 
Politics,” 132 they stress that “[t]he distinction between pocketbook and sociotropic politics is not equivalent to the 
distinction between a self-interested and an altruistic politics.” Thus, we know frustratingly little about how much voters 
are driven by self-interest. 
26 Melzer, Gun Crusaders. claims that this is common. 
27 This is consistent with survey data. See Jones, “Republicans and Democrats Have Grown Further Apart on What the 
Nation’s Top Priorities Should Be.” 
28 Kolodny, “Rule Over None I” and Viehoff, “Power and Equality.” 
29 For an older source of this idea, see Tocqueville, Democracy in America., 9,14. 
30For the quotes, see Rousseau, The Social Contract, 2.6.10 and UN, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” 
Article I, respectively. For some contemporary theories with this view, see Stilz, “The Value of Self-Determination” and 
Zuehl, Collective Self-Determination. 
 7 
values. So, the impact of voting behavior on equality and self-rule just is its impacts on the intrinsic 
value of democracy. But to determine this impact, we need the right conception of these values.  
 
Let us start with equality. Democracies, many think, are distinctively egalitarian. And many spell out 
democratic equality as a type of relational equality.31 In part, that consists in the avoiding of 
inegalitarian relationships. Paradigm examples of such relationships are those between a master and a 
slave or the members of different castes. Both relationships are intrinsically bad. And both 
relationships are part constituted by inequalities of power. Part of what it is to be a slave, or a member 
of a lower caste, is to lack relative power. What does democracy have to do with this? Well, we can 
more or less stipulatively define a democracy as a political system in which political power is equally 
distributed and the exercise of that power determines what government does.32 On such a definition, 
democracy is constituted by equalities of political power. Thus, democracy helps preclude inegalitarian 
relationships. This is what we will call the negative aspect of democratic equality. This aspect consists 
in the minimization of relationships of domination, subordination, hierarchy.  
 
But that does not exhaust the egalitarian value of democracy. This is because the mere absence of 
inegalitarian relationships does not exhaust relational egalitarian values. There are also intrinsically 
good relationships. On the small scale, friendship is the paradigm example. This is an intrinsically 
good, egalitarian, relationship. Friendship does not just amount to non-domination: you are not 
friends with all those who avoid subordinating you. And it is not just instrumentally useful to have 
friends; it is good in itself. Now there are some similarities between good friendships and relationships 
of non-domination. In particular, friendship in part consists in equalities of power. Good friends do 
not wield asymmetric power over one another. But friendship requires more than just such equalities. 
Friends must be committed to preventing inequalities from arising. You are not friends with someone 
who would lord it over you if they had the chance. And friends must care appropriately about one 
another’s welfare. You are not friends with someone who does not care about how your life goes. 
Friendship, in these ways, is a thicker relationship than mere non-domination.  
 
For democratic theory, the critical claim is that you can also have large scale such relationships. We 
will call these civic friendships.33 These consist in part in non-domination. Civic friends can look one 
another in the eye.34 They are not subservient to one another. But, for evaluating voter motivations, 
two further conditions on such relationships are critical. First, citizens’ commitment to avoiding 
inegalitarian relationships is important. Imagine someone who would, given the chance, make 
themselves the dictator of their fellow citizens. They are not committed to avoiding inegalitarian 
relationships. This diminishes the positive value of their relationships with their fellow citizens. If they 
are completely indifferent to the equality of those relationships, I suspect they are not in relationships 
of civic friendship at all. Second, citizens’ care for others’ welfare is important. Imagine someone who 
would sacrifice very little for the benefit of their fellow citizens. They do not care much about their 
fellow citizens’ welfare. This again diminishes the positive value of their relationship with their fellows. 
If they are completely indifferent to that welfare, then again they are not in relationships of civic 
 
31 This is the view in Kolodny, “Rule Over None I”; Viehoff, “Democratic Equality and Political Authority”; “Power and 
Equality.” See Christiano, The Rule of the Many; The Constitution of Equality for a different conception of equality. Most of 
what I say on the relational egalitarian conception would also go for Christiano’s conception. 
32 Kolodny, “Rule Over None II,” 197 also opts for an essentially stipulative definition of democracy. 
33 The term comes from Schwarzenbach, “On Civic Friendship.” See Viehoff, “Power and Equality” for the most extensive 
defense of this as a democratic value. Scheffler, “The Practice of Equality” provides the underlying positive conception of 
egalitarian relationships. 
34 The eyeballing metaphor comes from Pettit, On the People’s Terms, 47. 
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friendship at all. But when all these conditions are met, at least to a minimal extent, we have civic 
friendships. Democracy consists, in part, in the equalities of power necessary to these relationships. 
This is the positive aspect of democratic equality. It consists in democracy facilitating relationships of 
civic friendship.  
 
Let us now turn to a second democratic value: self-rule. This consists in the manifestation of the 
people’s will in their social and political affairs. The conception of this I favor hinges on joint 
intentions.35 A joint intention is just an intention one shares with other people. When we together 
intend to sing a duet, paint a house, raise a child we have a joint intention. Now suppose some citizens 
have a joint intention to bring about some political event. This could be an action of government or 
an outcome of government action. And suppose their having this intention brings about this thing. 
Then we can say that they are self-ruling with respect to that outcome or action. The more people are 
self-ruling with respect to more actions or outcomes, the more does the political system realize the 
value of self-rule. The more do political events manifest our joint intentions. What does democracy 
have to do with this? Well, for people to be self-ruling there must be a causal connection between 
their will and policy. On the definition above, democracy in part consists in such influence. Thus, 
democracy ensures that a necessary condition for self-rule is satisfied. This is another part of its 
intrinsic value.  
 
This is, right now, a controversial view. Recently, some egalitarians have said that the only democratic 
value is an egalitarian one.36 They have thought this because it is hard to give a good explanation of 
why self-rule is important. And without such an explanation, so they have thought, we should not 
think it is important. This seems to me rash. It is very intuitive that there’s a democratic value in the 
vicinity of self-rule. Here’s an example of the intuition: suppose we got rid of government by human 
beings. We replaced it with government by algorithm.37 The algorithm we replaced it with, let us 
stipulate, spits out perfect legislation. It institutes far superior legislation than any human government 
could. Yet, in this situation, citizens have no influence over the laws which govern them. It seems to 
me compelling that something is lost here. If we did this, we would be sacrificing something important 
about democracy. But that cannot be an egalitarian loss: in this case every person has equal political 
power (zero). Rather, it is a loss associated with lack of influence over the laws to which you are 
subject. So, intuitively, self-rule is valuable.  
 
But we would still like an explanation of why self-rule is valuable. The account I favor hinges on the 
value of self-authorship. Being the author of your life is attractive. It is good to be responsible for 
what has a big impact on your life. We can see this in personal cases. Compare two people. One has 
a conception of the good life and pursues it. They deliberately live their lives in accord with their 
values. The other makes few real choices. They might have a conception of the good life. But they do 
not pursue it: they just go with the flow. Intuitively, there’s something preferable about the first life. 
We want mastery; not drift. We want people to be the author of their own lives.38 In the personal case, 
what it is to be the author of things in your life is for your intending them to bring them about. You 
become a pilot because you intended to be; you marry your partner because it was who you wanted 
to marry. But there’s also a social dimension to this notion of authorship. You can, together with 
 
35 This type of account comes from Stilz, Liberal Loyalty and Zuehl, Collective Self-Determination. But, as I say in the text, I 
think the underlying idea has a long history. For example, we can see it in Rousseau’s The Social Contract. 
36 Kolodny, “Rule Over None II.” 
37 This case is from Zuehl, Collective Self-Determination, 18–19. 
38 Raz, The Morality of Freedom does much more to spell out the attractiveness of this thought. 
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others, intend to bring about certain political outcomes. When this joint intention brings about those 
outcomes, you are their joint author. This is valuable in much the same way single authorship is 
valuable. Such things have a huge impact on you. It is valuable to be part responsible for things with 
such an impact on you. Self-rule helps realize this value. 
 
So there are two parts to what makes democracy intrinsically valuable. On the one hand, democracy 
advances relational equality. This advancement itself has two aspects. The negative aspect amounts to 
the avoidance of inegalitarian relationships. The positive aspect amounts to the facilitation of 
egalitarian relationships. On the other hand, democracy advances self-rule. It helps make citizens joint 
authors of their social and political affairs. Advocacy of each value has a long history in democratic 
theory. It is plausible that both make democracy intrinsically valuable. Now there might be other 
things which make democracy intrinsically valuable. Perhaps the very act of democratic deliberation 
has intrinsic value. Perhaps simply resolving disagreement democratically has intrinsic value. And 
perhaps neither value reduces to the value of equality or self-rule. I doubt this, but I have given no 
evidence against it. Yet we will go forward with a focus on equality and self-rule. If there are other 
democratic values, then this will give us just a partial answer to how voting behavior affects intrinsic 
democratic values. But it will still provide an important part of the answer. So, with this caveat in 
mind, we can move to my first question. How does the prevalence of certain types of voter motivations 
affect these intrinsic democratic values?  
 
3. Evaluating Voter Motivations 
 
First, we look at issue voting. Suppose everyone voted on the basis of policy issues. Imagine policy 
stances motivated peoples’ vote choice. How much would this facilitate democratic values? I think the 
answer is: a lot. Let us start by looking at how it would affect self-rule. Consider the people who, in 
1932, voted for Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR). Imagine they did so because they wanted 
unemployment relief. This is a prerequisite for their having a joint intention to enact employment 
relief. It is a prerequisite for that intention bringing about unemployment relief. So enactment of 
employment relief might manifest the joint intentions of FDR voters. So, these people may be self-
ruling with respect to unemployment relief. More generally, issue voting is a prerequisite for policy 
manifesting joint intentions. The more widespread is issue voting, the better positioned are people to 
be self-ruling with respect to particular policies.  
 
Now, widespread issue voting does not guarantee such self-rule. Issue voters might not jointly intend 
to enact any policies. To see this, suppose that Bratman’s account of such intentions is right. Bratman 
thinks that some people have a joint intention to ɸ when (a) they each intend that they together ɸ, (b) 
they have jointly compatible plans for contributing to ɸ-ing and (c) they are not coerced into ɸ-ing.39 
Issue voters might fail to meet these conditions. They might, for example, only think of their own 
contribution to policy. They might not intend that they together with others enact policy. But, in truth, 
these conditions are not that hard to meet. FDR voters could have easily intended to bring about 
unemployment relief with other FDR voters. Their individuals plans to contribute to this—voting for 
FDR—are jointly compatible. And nobody was coerced into voting for FDR. So widespread issue 
voting does not ensure that voters have the joint intentions self-rule requires. But it puts them in a 
good position to have such intentions. It helps enable them to be self-ruling.  
 
39 Bratman, “Shared Cooperative Activity.” 
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Yet there is a more important way in which issue voters might fail to achieve the value of self-rule. 
They might be very incompetent. Suppose that they do not know much about FDR’s policies. They 
have an inkling that he’s the one offering a New Deal to the American people. But they cannot really 
remember. Might it not have been, they wonder, Hoover who was banging on about a deal? But, on 
the basis of the inkling, they vote FDR. Here, they are not very competent voters. If they aimed to 
help enact the New Deal, their actions did not very reliably contribute to this goal. They could have 
easily voted for the candidate who would stymie it. We will talk more about such incompetence in the 
next section. But, for now, I will just register the belief that when issue voters are incompetent in this 
way, they achieve little self-rule. Voter incompetence means policies at most match, rather than 
manifest, voters’ joint intentions. Thus, widespread issue voting aids, without assuring, the 
achievement of self-rule. 
 
Let us turn to equality. Citizens need certain attitudes to achieve the positive aspect of democratic 
equality. They must have some care for the welfare of their fellow citizens. They must be committed 
to avoiding inegalitarian relationships. Issue voters can fall short on these commitments. Consider 
people who voted for Wallace in 1968 because they liked his segregationist platform. These people 
were issue voters. But they do not achieve the positive aspect of democratic equality. They violate 
both conditions. They were not sufficiently concerned for the welfare of their fellow citizens. They 
were not sufficiently committed to the avoidance of inegalitarian relationships. So, for issue voters to 
help achieve this value, they cannot vote on the basis of odious commitments. But issue voting is 
compatible with such abstinence. Issue voters might well vote on issues which are not odious. So, not 
all issue voting is consistent with the positive egalitarian value. But there’s no inherent tension between 
issue voting and democratic equality. Issue voting, when combined with the other attitudes, does 
facilitate such equality.  
 
Second, we look at performance voting. Suppose everyone votes on the basis of expected performance 
in office. Expected performance motivates vote choice. How much does this facilitate democratic 
values? We will start with self-rule. Self-rule is a little less well achieved by widespread performance 
voting than by widespread issue voting. That is because it is only outcomes which can now manifest 
people’s intentions. Suppose people voted for FDR, in 1932, because they thought he would be a 
better economic performer than Hoover. That is a low bar. But it paid off handsomely. FDR did not 
just enact unemployment relief. He helped pull America out of the Great Depression. In this case, the 
economic upturn might well manifest the joint intentions of FDR voters. But the actual policies FDR 
implemented would not have manifested these intentions. More generally, performance voting fits 
with outcomes, rather than policies, manifesting voters’ intentions.  
 
Why is this worse than issue voting? Well, to explain that we have to make some more assumptions 
about issue voting. I assume that few people want a set of policies with total disregard for the outcomes 
of those policies. They think that those very policies will produce some desired outcomes. So they 
also have the intention to produce an outcome. So, for such issue voters, both policies and outcomes 
manifest their joint intentions. That is why they have a leg-up on performance voters. For performance 
voters, only the outcomes manifest the intentions. Performance voters might well be responsible for 
large parts of their social environment. But issue voters—at least given certain assumptions—are 
responsible for larger parts. But I want to be clear on my view here: the leg-up is the size of a small 
leg. Issue voting beats out performance voting on achieving self-rule. But the margin of victory is not 
large. Both seem to me respectable ways of achieving this value.  
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Let us turn to equality. Issue voting and performance voting are in the same position when it comes 
to equality. Performance voting does not guarantee the achievement of the positive aspect of 
democratic equality. Some people performance vote on the basis of inegalitarian commitments. Their 
performance voting will not aid this value. Some vote on sheer self-interest. They ask not what a 
candidate can do for their country, but just what the candidate can do for them. This does not help 
the achievement of democratic equality. But performance voters need not exhibit such misbehavior. 
They might vote for who they think will produce the best outcomes for all their fellow citizens. They 
might vote for Clinton because they think he'll make everyone better off. So widespread performance 
and issue voting are consistent with democratic equality. Neither ensure it, but both can facilitate it.  
 
Finally, we look at group voting. Suppose everyone votes on the basis of their group identities. They 
vote for candidates affiliated with the groups with which they identify. And they do this to boost the 
relative social standing of their group. How does this affect democratic values? We start with self-rule. 
This type of voter motivation, were it widespread, would not be good for self-rule. When you group 
vote, neither the policies of government nor the outcomes of those policies manifest your intentions. 
You did not intend to bring about any particular policies. You did not intend to bring about any 
particular outcomes. You voted on the basis of group affiliation. So group voters do not enjoy self-
rule with respect to policies or their outcomes. Now it is not that they enjoy nothing. When they get 
someone affiliated with their group into office, this can count as the manifestation of their intentions. 
Any ensuing change in social hierarchies can also count as manifesting their intentions. But, generally, 
such changes are not enormous. Obama’s election did not transform race relations in the United 
States. So this makes voters, at best, responsible for but minor changes in status hierarchies. Yet such 
minor changes are less important to citizens’ social and political affairs than is government policy, and 
the huge changes to social life wrought by such policy. Thus, widespread group voting would not 
much help the achievement of self-rule.  
 
Now let us consider equality. Is widespread group voting consistent with the positive aspect of 
democratic equality? This depends on the type of group voting. There are three types. First, there’s 
maintaining superiority. Suppose one identifies with a group which holds a privileged place in a social 
hierarchy. One votes as one does to maintain this group’s elevated place in the hierarchy. This is surely 
incompatible with a commitment to social equality. You cannot be both committed to social equality 
and motivated by maintaining the status superiority of your group. This is exactly a vote motivated by 
a commitment to social inequality. In the United States, some instances of racial voting give us 
concrete examples of this. The United States is a racially stratified society. It is not white people who 
suffer the racial oppression. So consider the case of white people who vote on the basis of their racial 
identity. This is a case of maintaining social superiority. If such voting is widespread, then that impairs 
the realization for the positive egalitarian value. 
 
Second, there is creating superiority. Suppose one identifies with a group which holds neither a high nor 
low place in the social hierarchy. One hopes one’s vote will facilitate a realignment in status hierarchies. 
It will help this group gain status and, in particular, become superior to other groups. This again is 
incompatible with a commitment to social equality. Such voting behavior is part of a commitment to 
social inequality. The best concrete examples of this is voting on the basis of party identification. In 
the United States, party groups hold roughly similar levels of social status. So, consider Republicans 
who vote for the Republican candidate to raise the social status of Republicans. They are attempting 
to create social superiority. This is incompatible with a commitment to social equality. So widespread 
group voting of this type would also impair the positive aspect of democratic equality.  
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Third, there is ameliorating inferiority. Suppose one identifies with a group which holds a low place in the 
social hierarchy. One votes for a group-affiliated candidate to ameliorate the status inferiority of this 
group. One hopes that, if the candidate wins election, the group will gain status. The status gain will 
not make that group superior to other comparison groups. Rather it will make it closer to their equal. 
This seems completely consistent with a commitment to social inequality. The driving force here is 
not a desire for social superiority. It is a desire for equality. In the United States, much race-based 
voting exemplifies this. Consider black voters who voted for Obama. This need not have hurt the 
positive aspect of democratic equality. In this case, elevating one’s group’s status amounted to 
diminishing America’s racial hierarchies. This is surely a motivation compatible with egalitarian 
commitments. So, widespread group voting of this type is quite consistent with democratic equality.  
 
So different kinds of group voting interact differently with democratic equality. Voting in order to 
ameliorate the inferiority of a group is compatible with the positive aspects of equality. One can have 
attractive egalitarian relationships with people moved by such motivations. But voting in order to 
protect or produce the superiority of a group clashes with this aspect. This type of voting manifests a 
lack of commitment to equality. One cannot have a civic friendship with those who wholly lack such 
commitments and one’s civic friendships are impaired with those who have only very weak such 
commitments. So, how group voting impacts the positive aspects of equality depends on the type of 
group voting in play. Now that does not mean group voting impacts the negative aspect of democratic 
equality. I doubt it does. Group voting, by itself, never puts people into relationships of subordination. 
But it can prevent relationships of civic friendship. It thus impairs the positive, but not the negative, 
aspect of democratic equality.  
 
Let me conclude the section by returning to an issue I raised in section 1. We have been exploring the 
question of how the prevalence of different voter motivations impacts democratic values. But these 
motivations are often combined in individuals: often, single voters are moved to some extent by all 
three types of motivation. How does that affect our discussion? To account for this, the key thing we 
need to be able to do is evaluate how much each motivation matters on average. The larger the average 
impact of issue voting, and to a lesser extent performance voting, the better positioned is a democracy 
to achieve self-rule. The more can citizens’ social and political affairs manifest their joint intentions. 
The larger the average impact of privileged group identities, the worse positioned is a democracy to 
achieve the positive aspect of democratic equality. The more civic friendships are more seriously 
damaged. This, in effect, answers the first question of this paper. Roughly speaking, issue voting is 
best, followed by performance voting, followed by group voting. And that answer puts us in a better 
position to assess how voters’ motivations affect the value of American democracy. But we are not 
yet in a quite good enough position. For how these motivations matter to democratic values depends 
on how competent voters are. So we now turn to voter competence.  
 
4. Voter Competence 
 
Let us say that someone is competent with respect to a certain aim when they reliably do what 
promotes that aim. They do what promotes that aim in many contexts. Let us say that voters are 
competent insofar as they are competent with respect to the aims which underly their vote. In this 
section, we will look at how voter competence modulates the contribution those aims make to 
democratic values. This is crucial to do for two reasons. First, it tightens our grip on how voter 
motivation and democratic values relate. It tells us when certain motivations successfully contribute 
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to those values. Second, we need to do this to understand how voter motivation contributes to the 
value of American democracy. There are well-known doubts about the competence of American 
voters.40 If voter motivation only contributes to democratic values when voters are sufficiently 
competent, then that matters to our assessment of that contribution. So, what is required of voter 
competence for voter motivation to contribute to democratic values?  
 
It depends on the value. Let us start with self-rule. Suppose voters wanted to vote for the candidate 
who would perform best. But imagine that they are utterly incompetent. They judge candidates on the 
basis of good looks or how well tank helmets fit on their head.41 But head size does not predict which 
candidate will be the best performer. Yet suppose the lucky thing happens: a majority of voters do 
end up voting for the best performer. As previously noted, intuitively this means that the good 
performance does not manifest their joint intentions in the sense necessary for self-rule. For this type 
of manifestation, their vote and the good performance has to be more reliably connected. Voters, in 
general, have to be competent in order for the value of self-rule to be achieved. Now, that is not to 
say that there’s a sharp cut-off at which they achieve the anointed standard of competence. Rather we 
should think of it in scalar terms. The more competent voters are, the more of the value of self-rule 
they can attain. So, when voters are quite incompetent, their issue and performance voting contribute 
little to self-rule.  
 
I think this point is clear in personal cases. Imagine that you start a business. But, let us suppose, you 
are not a very good businessperson. You hire layabouts, invest in fads, advertise on Myspace. Left to 
your own devices, you'd quickly run your new business into the ground. But, fortunately for you, you 
are a Rockefeller. And your indulgent uncle is both a very good businessman and very, very rich. He 
works behind the scenes to rectify your mistakes. He hires hard workers. He contacts the right 
politicians. He intimidates your competitors (he’s a Rockefeller, too). This makes your business a 
moderate success. In this case, it seems to me that you are not the author of this success. That is 
because you were so unreliable at achieving it. You were only saved by fortuitous family connections. 
So, that success does not really redound to your credit. In this personal case, incompetence seems to 
undercut the achievement of authorship. That is evidence that, in the political case, incompetence also 
undercuts the achievement of authorship. When people are not competent with respect to their goals, 
in both cases, they are less the authors of those goals. The achievement of those goals merely matches, 
rather than manifests, their intentions.  
 
Let us turn to equality. Here the key question is whether incompetent voting is incompatible with the 
attitudes that the positive egalitarian value requires. If you are incompetent, does that imply you lack 
a commitment to equality? Does it imply that you do not care appropriately about your fellow citizens’ 
welfare? At first glance, the answer seems to be a clear “no.” One can have goals one is no good at 
achieving. Suppose you care deeply about your nephew’s welfare. But they live in England and you 
live in the United States. You just cannot keep up with their life. The tyranny of distance defeats you. 
So you never get them the right Christmas presents. You get them films when they want games, sugar 
candy when they want chocolate, scarfs when they want “jumpers.” You are not very good at 
contributing to their welfare. But that does not imply that you do not care about their welfare. You 
can care about things you are not very good at promoting. So, at first glance, voter competence need 
not matter to how voter motivations impact democratic equality.  
 
40 See, for example, Brennan, The Ethics of Voting, ch.7. 
41 Good looks do sometimes drive vote choice. See Ahler et al., “Face Value?” for some recent evidence. The import of 
head size turns on your take on Michael Dukakis’s ill-fated presidential push. 
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But perhaps first glances deceive. There are cases where your incompetence does make for a lack of 
concern. Suppose you could easily find out what your nephew wanted. You just need to phone your 
sister. Then your incompetence suggests you do not care that much about your nephew’s welfare. 
Your unwillingness to pick up the phone in part constitutes a lack of substantial concern. Two things 
are going on in this case. First, it is not very costly to become competent. You just need to dial the 
sibling. Second, this minor cost really boosts the chances of achieving the relevant goal. Calling your 
sister will make you much more likely to give your nephew good presents. So, when increasing your 
competence is relatively easy, and would substantially improve the chances of achieving some goal, 
lack of competence constitutes your not putting much weight on the goal at all.  
 
But voting meets neither condition. It is not easy to become a very competent voter. You have to 
spend a lot of time reading things like Politico and The New York Times. That is all time stolen from 
other, more valuable, activities. And, more importantly, there is little chance that such competence 
will make a difference to the welfare of your fellow citizens. This is because there is so little chance 
your vote will make a difference. Rarely do individual votes decide elections. Even if you were the 
most competent voter in the world, that would in expectation yield a tiny benefit to your fellow 
citizens. So, I suspect that you can be an incompetent voter while having the attitudes that the positive 
egalitarian value requires. Incompetence does not constitute a failure to care enough about your fellow 
citizens welfare or to be committed to equality. So self-rule is only achieved by reasonably competent 
voters. But the positive aspect of democratic equality imposes minimal standards of voter competence.  
 
5. The American Voter 
 
We can now see how the motivations of the American voter contribute to democratic values. This 
tells us, in part, the extent to which American democracy achieves these values. We first address self-
rule. I have already suggested that issue voters are scarce. If this is true, then only the performance 
voters can realize this value. How many of those are there? Well, when you ask voters what they like 
about candidates, about forty percent mention performance issues. About thirty percent mention 
topics like the economy. Up to ten percent mention candidates’ personal qualities.42 So this seems an 
upper bound for the number of performance voters in the American electorate. And it is a respectable 
upper bound: forty percent of voters is a lot of voters.  
 
Yet, unfortunately, I doubt these voters enjoy much of the value of self-rule. The problem is that 
many voters are rather incompetent. To see this, we draw from Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels’ 
great book: Democracy for Realists. They argue, persuasively, that American performance voters are 
“myopic” and “blind.” They are myopic in the sense that they only vote retrospectively on short-term 
performance. They are blind in the sense that they punish incumbents for things out of their control. 
Fixating on short-term performance and kicking incumbents for acts of God are not, I suspect, reliable 
ways to pick good performers. So I suspect American performance voters are not competent 
performance voters. Insofar as these suspicions are accurate, American voters will not achieve much 
of the value of self-rule.  
 
 
42 Lewis-Beck et al., The American Voter Revisited, ch. 10. 
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What is the evidence for voters’ myopia and blindness? Let us start with myopia. Now everyone knows 
that economic performance correlates with incumbent vote share. But economic performance can be 
different over different time periods. It might be good over four years, but less good over the last two 
years. So Achen and Bartels test what period of economic performance is associated with incumbent 
vote share.43 They find that an extra percentage of real income growth in the six months before the 
presidential election is associated with a large increase in incumbent popular vote margin: seven and a 
half percentage points. Income growth at other times, they find, is not associated with any change in 
the incumbent’s vote margin. They conclude that voters are just responding to economic conditions 
around the time they are voting. If that is right, then voters only care only what you have done for 
them lately. They are myopic, in the sense that they fixate on the recent past.44  
 
Now turn to blindness. Again, the best piece of evidence for voter blindness comes from Achen and 
Bartels.45 They point out that the level of rainfall matters to voters’ welfare. Low rainfall means 
drought; high rainfall means flooding. But the weather is outside of incumbents’ control. Thus, they 
investigate how, in the United States, incumbent vote share tracks rainfall. They find very low and 
very high rainfall are each associated with lower incumbent vote share. They conclude that voters are 
punishing incumbents for something over which they have no control: bad weather. This is not a 
reliable way to pick good performers. Thus, insofar as Achen and Bartels are correct, American 
performance voters are not competent. So these voters likely achieve little of the value of self-rule. 
American democracy, then, can attain little of this value. The American voter, at least by the lights of 
the evidence I have presented, pushes that value largely out of reach.46  
 
But what about democratic equality? In particular, does American voting behavior impair the positive 
aspect of democratic equality? Let us start with the impact of performance voting. Here competency 
matters. But the competency constraint I advanced was minimal. Indeed, I think even myopic and 
blind voters can meet it. After all, myopic and blind voters are not completely incompetent: they still 
managed to kick out Hoover. They just have a low level of competency. But there is a tiny chance that 
their vote makes a difference. So this low competency is consistent with having the attitudes that the 
positive egalitarian value demands. It need not mean that voters do not care appropriately about their 
fellow citizens or are not sufficiently committed to equality. The lack of competency evinced by 
American voters, then, does not much matter to democratic equality.  
 
Let us turn to group voting. Here the outlook is much gloomier. The first problem arises from the 
pervasive impact of partisan identification on voting behavior. I noted above that voting on the basis 
of party identification involves voting in order to elevate your own social group above other social 
groups. It is a case of creating superiority. That is incompatible with a commitment to social equality. 
This is bad news for the positive value of equality in American democracy. Partisans on each side are 
trying to make themselves superior to those on the other. They cannot at the same time forge valuable 
egalitarian relationships across party lines. Substantively, that is of enormous import. Partisan 
 
43 Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, 146–76. 
44 Healy and Malhotra, “Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy” and Montalvo, “Voting after the Bombings” report 
similar outcomes with respect to natural disasters and terrorist attacks respectively. Healy and Lenz, “Substituting the End 
for the Whole” argue that this is a manifestation of the “end” part of peak-end effects.  
45 Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, 116–146. The corroborating literature is now quite large. For a review, see Healy 
and Malhotra, “Retrospective Voting Reconsidered.”  
46 I defend a similar conclusion, but on different grounds, in Lovett, “Democratic Autonomy and the Shortcomings of 
Citizens.” 
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identification is probably the strongest influence on voting behavior.47 Since it severs positively 
valuable egalitarian relationships, only a few such relationships can span party lines. Cross-partisan 
relationships cannot be civic friendships.  
 
Yet things are worse than that. To see why, we have to look at some more empirical evidence. And 
we will need to turn to current affairs: we will need to turn to the 2016 election of Donald Trump. 
One of the most crucial points about Trump’s rise is its connection to white identity. In the primaries, 
white voters more attached to their white identity were much more likely to vote for Trump. He won 
the general election with a majority of fifteen points amongst white voters. Again, white identifiers 
were most likely to vote for him. The reason is not obscure. His rhetoric was littered with both implicit 
and explicit racial appeals.48 These appeals helped cement Trump as the candidate of white Americans. 
He swept to office on a wave of white identity voting.49 White identity voting, as we noted above, is 
incompatible with civic friendship. You cannot stand in such an egalitarian relationship with someone 
while trying to cement your superiority over them. 
 
Trump contributed to this wave. But he did not create it. Thirty to forty percent of white Americans 
say that being white is very, or extremely, important to their identity.50 And white identity voting 
mattered well before Trump. It seems to have reduced the vote for Obama as well as for black 
candidates in other elections.51 For at least a decade, then, millions of white Americans have voted on 
the basis of protecting their lofty place in America’s racial hierarchy. And white people are probably 
not the only members of a privileged group to vote on the basis of the group identity. For example, 
Trump won by twelve percentage points amongst men. The more sexist someone was the more likely 
they were to vote for him.52 So it seems plausible (although the evidence is less strong) that male 
identity also mattered to vote choice. In short, group voting in America is not the preserve of 
oppressed groups. The members of privileged groups often vote on the basis of their group identity. 
  
This is even worse news for the positive aspect of democratic equality. Voting behavior rends 
positively valuable egalitarian relationships between partisans. And it also seems to, often, prevent 
them between the more and less privileged. That means those relationships cannot hold between each 
American citizen. Now that does not mean they cannot hold between anyone. Not every white person 
votes on their white identity. Not every partisan votes on party identity. Those who do not can share 
the positively valuable egalitarian relationships. But millions of people do vote on such bases. So the 
American voter strikes a blow against the positive aspect of democratic equality. That leaves the 
negative aspect of the democratic equality untouched. It does not by itself make American citizens 





47 For the source of this position, see Campbell et al., The American Voter.. For recent forceful advocates, see again Achen 
and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, 232–266. 
48 The New York Times keeps a list of Trump’s racist comments. See Leonhardt and Philbrick, “Donald Trump’s Racism.” 
49 The story here comes from Jardina, White Identity Politics, 230–47.  
50 Jardina, White Identity Politics, 63. 
51 Petrow, Transue, and Vercellotti, “Do White In-Group Processes Matter, Too?” 
52 Schaffner, Macwilliams, and Nteta, “Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President.” 
53 I explore a problem for the negative aspect of democratic equality in Lovett, “Must Egalitarians Condemn Representative 
Democracy?” 
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6. How Should We Vote? 
 
We are now in a position to give a partial answer the question to the third question: how should we 
vote? The question here concerns how actual American citizens should vote, given the condition of 
American democracy. My answer will be partial. We will look at just the reasons democratic values 
give rise to. I think that the value of self-rule can give rise to two types of reasons with respect to 
voting behavior. First, it can give rise to a self-interested reason. You yourself benefit from achieving 
this value. But you only achieve this when your fellow citizens put you in a position to achieve it. They 
must have the intentions which would underpin a joint intention. And they must have formed those 
intentions competently. Otherwise it does not matter how you vote. The incompetence of your fellow 
citizens puts the value of self-rule out of reach. But neither condition is usually met in the United 
States. American voters, as we have seen, often lack the motivations they need to achieve the value of 
self-rule. They are often group voters. And those who are performance voters are rarely competent 
performance voters. So, in the United States, self-rule provides little self-interested reason to vote on 
particular motivations.  
 
Second, the value of self-rule can give rise to an altruistic reason. Generally, we should help out our 
fellow citizens. If our doing something helps them achieve some good, we have reason to do the thing. 
One of our reasons to pay our taxes is that it helps us get good roads, parks, schools. It helps out our 
co-citizens. Thus, were American voters good competent issue voters, you'd have reason to be such a 
voter yourself. This would help them achieve the value of self-rule. But again as we have seen, 
American voters are not competent issue voters. So being such a voter does not help them achieve 
self-rule. You can only help those who help themselves. So you lack this altruistic reason to be a 
competent issue voter. Thus I doubt the value of self-rule gives American voters any reason to vote 
in certain ways. It would in an ideal democracy. In an ideal democracy it would give American voters 
reason to be competent issue voters. But in our deeply non-ideal, real-world case, it is normatively 
inert.  
 
Now one might resist this. Suppose you endorse a view like rule-consequentialism. On this view, one 
should act in line with the rules which, were they widely accepted, would lead to the best consequences. 
So imagine your college needs a million dollars to stay open. If every member of the college gave the 
college a thousand dollars it would stay afloat. This would be to great benefit overall. So you should 
give the college a thousand dollars. And you should do this even when you know you are throwing 
your money into the abyss; you know that your perfidious colleagues will never chip in. This sort of 
view says that you should be a competent issue voter despite it achieving nothing. For if everyone 
accepted the rule “be a competent issue voter,” then we would achieve the value of self-rule. So my 
position will not be congenial to people with such rule-based moral views. But I am skeptical of such 
views. The cases at hand are exactly those where they seem to go wrong. In these cases, following 
such rules seems pointless. So, the relevant cases seem like counterexamples to such views. That is 
not secure footing from which to resist the position I have put forward.  
 
Let us turn to equality. This gives rise to reasons connected to the constraints on egalitarian 
relationships. You should not do things which sever your egalitarian relationships. Now, were America 
entirely devoid of egalitarian civic relationships, this too would not matter. But that is not the picture 
I just painted. Millions of people may vote on party identification and privileged identities. But millions 
also do not. You still have reason to avoid severing your egalitarian relationships with these latter 
people. That means you should not vote on certain group identities. Voting on party identification 
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seems out. Voting on whiteness or masculinity is definitely out. Such voting precludes a commitment 
to equality. In short, you cannot be the type of group voter who votes on the basis of privileged group 
identities. Now that does not preclude voting on unprivileged group identities. Ninety-six percent of 
black voters voted for Obama. They need not have been doing anything wrong. But it precludes much 
group voting all the same. So equality imposes constraints on your motivations. Does it also impose 
constraints on your competence? Only minimal ones. This is because acquiring competence is costly 
and the chances of it making a difference are low. Thus you need not hit the books to meet the 
requirements of democratic equality.54 Equality mainly requires you to manage the motivations 
underlying your vote.  
 
So we have shed some light on how we ought to vote. Insofar as achieving democratic values is 
important, we have reason not to vote on certain motivations. In ideal democracies, this reason would 
be quite constraining. We'd have reason to be competent issue voters. But the non-ideal nature of 
American democracy makes a crucial difference. It means democratic values impose quite lax 
standards on voting behavior. As long as we do not vote on relatively privileged identities, we are likely 
doing all that such values require of us. Of course, many of us fall short of even these standards. Many 
voters vote on white identity. Many more are driven by party identity. But the standard is not, in 




Let me sum up. We started with three questions. The first concerned how the prevalence of difference 
kind of voter motivations mattered to intrinsic democratic values. I have argued that issue voting 
would be best, followed by performance voting, followed by group voting. The second concerned 
how much American voters contribute to these values. I have argued: not much. The American voter 
often lacks the motivations, or the competence, necessary to contributing to either equality or self-
rule. The third concerned how Americans should vote. I have argued that Americans need not pretend 
that they live in an ideal democracy. In their non-ideal democracy, they only do wrong by voting on 
relatively privileged identities. This covers much of the territory of how voter motivation interacts, 
both evaluatively and deontically, with intrinsic democratic values. It also leaves much of that territory 
uncovered. But it suffices to show, I think, that voter motivations matter to democracy.56  
 
 




54 Jason Brennan, of course, argues that voters have reasons to be competent which are not grounded in self-rule or 
equality. See Brennan, The Ethics of Voting, ch. 3. I have not engaged with his argument here. 
55 Now, as I have said, some people have a sunnier view of American voters than I think is accurate. See, for example, 
Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder, “The Strength of Issues.” They should think that American democracy is in a better 
position to achieve democratic values than I do. And they should also think American voters are under more stringent 
obligations than I take them to be. If most voters are competent and vote on the issues, then each voter has reason to be 
competent and vote on the issues. Thus, empirical premises aside, the theoretical upshot of this section is that there are 
systematic dependencies between the quality of a democracy and how its voters have reason to vote. 
56 For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I would like to thank Daniel Brinkerhoff-Young, Jane Friedman, 
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